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is true for the median choice rule, which is found to be strategy-proof
and group-strategic-proof not only over the full set of alternatives,
but also over every possible policy agenda. The paper also shows the
close relation between single-crossing and order-restriction. And it
uses this relation together with the strategy-proofness of the median
choice rule to prove that the collective outcome predicted by the
Representative Voter Theorem can be implemented in dominant
strategies through a simple mechanism in which, ﬁrst, individuals
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11 Introduction
In the last twenty ﬁve years, single-crossing has become a “popular” fea-
ture of preferences within the ﬁeld of Political Economy.1 From the seminal
works of Roberts (1977) and Grandmont (1978) and, more recently, due to
the theoretical developments of Rothstein (1990, 1991), Gans and Smart
(1996) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1999), it is now well-known that this
domain restriction is suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of equilibria in
one-dimensional models of majority voting, especially in situations where
single-peakedness may not hold.
Moreover, this restriction is not only technically convenient, but it also
makes sense in many political settings. In few words, the single-crossing prop-
erty used in the context of voting, which is similar to that used in principal-
agent literature and monotone comparative statics, says that, given any two
policies, one of them more to the right than the other, the more rightist is
an individual (with respect to another individual) the more he will prefer the
right-wing policy over the left-wing one.
Thus, unlike single-peakedness, single-crossing is a restriction that im-
poses limitations across individual preferences, on the character of voters’
heterogeneity, rather than on the shape of individual preferences. The main
idea behind it is that, in many circumstances, ordering people according
to a single parameter (like income, productivity, intertemporal preferences,
ideological position, etc.) may be more natural than ordering alternatives.
Hence, under this condition, the conﬂict of interests among individuals is
assumed to be projected into a one-dimensional parameter space, and then
the types of the agents are assigned a position over this left-right scale with
the requirement that, for any pair of alternatives, the set of types preferring
one of the alternatives all lie to one side of those who prefer the other.
It turns out that this condition not only guarantees the existence of ma-
jority voting equilibria, but it also provides a simple characterization of the
core of the majority rule. In fact, the core is simply the set of ideal points of
the median type agent in the ordering of individuals with respect to which
the preference proﬁle is single-crossing.2 This result is sometimes referred
to in the literature as the Representative Voter Theorem (Rothstein, 1991)
(henceforth RVT) or, alternatively, as “the second version” of the Median
Voter Theorem (Myerson, 1996 and Gans and Smart, 1996).
1See, for example, the diﬀerent applications found in Persson and Tabellini (2000).
2In contrast, under single-peaked preferences, the core of the majority rule consists of
the median ideal points in the ordering of alternatives with respect to which the proﬁle is
single-peaked.
2The main problem with this result is that, unlike the original Median
Voter Theorem over single-peaked preferences, whose non-cooperative foun-
dation was provided by Black (1948), ﬁrst, and then by Moulin (1980), the
RVT is based on the assumption that individuals honestly reveal their prefer-
ences. That is, it is derived assuming sincere voting. Clearly, this assumption
is diﬃcult to maintain in applications that focus on policy choices made in
strategic frameworks. Hence, a natural question arises respect to its appli-
cability in those models.
This paper studies the strategic foundation of the Representative Voter
Theorem. As a by-product, it also considers the existence of non-trivial
strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of single-crossing pref-
erence proﬁles and over the non-negative real line. There are several reasons
that justify to carry out this analysis. But the ﬁrst and more important
one is that, even though single-crossing is now largely used in models of col-
lective decision-making, nothing has been said in the literature about the
possibility of manipulation over this domain. In particular, people uses the
“single-crossing version” of the Median Voter Theorem without caring much
about its strategic foundation. So, one of the main purposes here is to ﬁll
out this gap.
In addition, the study is also motivated by a more technical fact, though
not less important. The analysis of strategic voting in the context of single-
crossing preferences leads to consider strategy-proofness over a preference
domain where there exists a linear orde r i n go ft h et y p e so ft h ea g e n t sa n d ,
therefore, a speciﬁck i n do fcorrelation among individual preferences. This
c o n t r a s t sw i t hm u c ho ft h ew o r kd e v e l o pe di nt h eﬁeld, which focuses on social
choice rules deﬁned over Cartesian preference domains.3 Moreover, this fea-
ture looks interesting for studying manipulation in multi-dimensional choice
spaces and over constrained sets of alternatives, a problem that is extremely
important in Political Economy (since voters usually have to choose from
sets with only a few policies, rather than from the full set of alternatives).
The main result of the paper shows that single-crossing preferences consti-
tute a domain restriction in the real line that allows not only majority voting
equilibria, but also non-manipulable choice rules. In particular, this is true
for the median choice rule, which is found to be strategy-proof and group-
strategic-proof not only over the full set of alternatives, but also over every
possible policy agenda. This paper also shows the close relation between
single-crossing and order-restriction. And it uses this relation together with
the strategy-proofness of the median choice rule to prove that the collective
outcome predicted by the Representative Voter Theorem can be implemented
3We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue.
3in dominant strategies through a simple mechanism in which, ﬁrst, individ-
uals select a representative among themselves, and then the representative
voter chooses a policy to be implemented by the planner.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, the
notation and the deﬁnitions. Section 3 exhibits the equivalence between
single-crossing and order-restriction for preferences indexed by the types of
the agents. Section 4 presents the non-strategic version of the Represen-
tative Voter Theorem (the “order-restricted version” of the Median Voter
Theorem). The results related to strategy-proofness and the indirect im-
plementation of the median choice rule over single-crossing preferences are
presented in section 5, which also uses these and the results of section 3 to
derive, as a by-product, the game-theoretic counterpart of the Representa-
tive Voter Theorem. The consequences of these results and further lines of
research that stem from them are discussed in section 6.
2 The model, notation and deﬁnitions
The basic model of single-crossing preferences assumes that the set of agents
I is ﬁnite and its cardinality |I| = n>2 is odd. Individuals in I must
choose a policy (for example, the level of a public good) from a feasible set
of alternatives. They do this by voting.
T h es e to fa l lp o s s i b l ec o l l e c t i v eo u t c o m e sX = {x1,...,x l}, |X| > 2, is
assumed to be a ﬁnite subset of the non-negative real line <+.T h es e tX is
such that xj ≤ xk for j ≤ k, where the linear order ≤ is the usual order on <+.
For a vector x =( x1,...,x n) ∈ <n
+,w el e tx−i =( x1,...,x i−1,x i+1,...,x n)
and (ˆ xi,x −i)=( x1,...,x i−1, ˆ xi,x i+1,...,x n), where ˆ xi ∈ <+. In addition,
for any group of agents D ⊆ I,w ed e n o t e( xD,x Dc)=( ( xi)i∈D, (xj)j∈Dc),
where Dc = I\D.
The set of all feasible alternatives may be either the entire X or just one
of its non-empty subsets. The set ˜ X represents a generic subset - with the
induced order - of X.W e u s e A(X) to represent the set of all non-empty
subsets of X, A(X)={ ˜ X : ˜ X ∈ 2X\∅}.I nw o r d s ,X is the universal set of
outcomes, whereas a particular situation, or agenda,i n v o l v e sa ˜ X ∈ A(X).
Let P(X) be the set of all complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary
orderings of X.W e s a y P(X)i st h euniversal domain of individual pref-
erences.4 Agent i’s preferences over the alternatives in X are assumed to
be completely characterized by a single parameter θi ∈ Θ = {θ1,...,θm},
where Θ ⊂ < is a ﬁnite and ordered subset of the real line, such that
4Indiﬀerence between alternatives is not allowed. This is a natural assumption when
the set of alternatives is ﬁnite.
4θ1 < θ2 <. . .<θm and m ≤ |P(X)|. As usual, we interpret θi as be-
ing agent i’s type.
That is, we assume there exists a function Φ : Θ → P(X) that assigns a
unique element Âθi∈ P(X)t oe a c hθi ∈ Θ.W e s a y t h a t Âi represents the
preferences of an agent i of type θi if,
∀x, y ∈ X, x Âi y ⇔ x Φ(θi) y.
The following example illustrates how these preferences can arise natu-
rally in many political-economic settings:
Example 1 (Persson and Tabellini, 2000) Consider the following simpliﬁed
version of the redistributive distortionary taxation model of Roberts (1977).
Suppose individual i ∈ I has preferences w(ci,l i)=ci + v(li), v0(·) > 0,
v00(·) ≤ 0,w h e r eci denotes individual consumption and li leisure. The in-
dividual’s budget constraint is ci ≤ (1 − t)hi + f,w h e r e0 <t<1 is an
income tax rate, f represents a lump-sum transfer and hi is the individ-
ual labor supply. Individuals are heterogenous in a productivity parameter
θi ∈ Θ ⊂ <, which is distributed in the population with mean ¯ θ. Given these
diﬀerent productivities, each individual i faces an “eﬀective” time constraint
1 − θi ≥ li + hi. Finally, it is assumed that the government runs a balanced
budget; i.e., f ≤ t(
P
i hi/n). S o l v i n gt h em o d e l ,w eh a v et h a tt h ei n d u c e d
policy preferences of agent i over alternative tax rates are
ui(t)=u(t;θi)=h(t)+v[1 − h(t) − ¯ θ] − (1 − t)(θi − ¯ θ),
where h(t)=1− ¯ θ − v
−1
l (1 − t) is the average labor supply. 2
The maximal set associated with the pair hX,Âii is M(X, Âi)={x ∈
X : ∀y ∈ X\{x},xÂi y}.T h a ti s ,M(X, Âi) yields the alternative that is
top-ranked in X for i with respect to her preferences Âi.N o t i c et h a ts i n c e
preferences are strict, maximal sets are indeed singletons.
A preference proﬁle associated to a proﬁle of types θ =( θ1,...,θn) ∈ Θn
is an n-tuple (Â1,...,Ân)=( Φ(θ1),...,Φ(θn)) in P(X)n. This means the
proﬁle of individual preferences depends on the state θ ∈ Θn:i nt h es t a t e
θ,a g e n ti has preferences Φ(θi)o v e rt h es e tX. This formulation allows for
any degree of correlation across the agents’ preferences. We assume each
agent observes θ, so there is complete information among the agents about
their preferences over X. Extending our earlier conventions to preference
proﬁles, we have Â−i=( Â1,...,Âi−1, Âi+1,...,Ân). Similarly, the proﬁle
obtained by changing agent i’s preferences for ˆ Âi is (ˆ Âi, Â−i)=( Â1,...,Âi−1
, ˆ Âi, Âi+1,...,Ân). Finally, for any group of agents D ⊆ I,( ÂD, ÂDc)=
((Âi)i∈D, (Âj)j∈Dc).
5Now, we restrict the set of admissible preference proﬁles by imposing a
condition on preferences that involves the entire proﬁle:
Deﬁnition 1 A preference proﬁle (Â1,...,Ân) derived from Φ : Θ → P(X)
is single-crossing on X if, for all x, y ∈ X and all i, j ∈ I such that y>x
and θj > θi,
y Φ(θi)x ⇒ yΦ(θj)x. SC
We denote SC(X) the set of all single-crossing preference proﬁles on X.5
The recent interest on this restricted domain of preferences is due to the fact
that, like single-peakedness,6 single-crossing has been shown to be suﬃcient
to guarantee the existence of majority voting equilibria. However, apart from
this fact, it should be clear that both domain conditions are independent, in
the sense that neither property is logically implied by the other. In Example
1, for instance, it is easy to see that the proﬁle of induced policy preferences
(u1,...,u n)s a t i s ﬁes single-crossing. However, for h(t)s u ﬃciently convex, it
violates single-peakedness. (See also Examples 2 and 3 below.)
Furthermore, from the perspective of the analysis of strategy-proofness,
there is a huge diﬀerence among these two preference domains. While single-
peaked proﬁles of individual preferences deﬁne a subset of P(X)n that con-
stitutes a Cartesian product, single-crossing proﬁles do not. That is, SC(X)
cannot be written as a Cartesian-product preference domain. The reason is
that individual preference orderings (or types) in (Â1,...,Ân) ∈ SC(X)a r e
correlated, in the sense speciﬁed in Deﬁnition 1, instead of being completely
independent of each other.
As we will see, this implies that, even if a social choice function (yet to
be deﬁned) is strategy-proof on SC(X), a mechanism implementing it has
to be more complex than a straightforward one. We will return to this point
in the last section of the paper. For the moment, let us illustrate how these
preferences look like through the following two examples:
Example 2 Suppose there are three types (each of them possibly associated
to a group of individuals), indexed θ1 < θ2 < θ3, who must choose an alter-
native from the ﬁnite subset {x, y, z} ⊂ <+, x<y<z . Assume that the
types have the preferences depicted in Table 1 below. It is easy to see that
5Other expressions used in the literature to denominate this preference restriction are
hierarchical adherence, order-restriction and unidimensional alignment. For more on them,
see Roberts (1977), Rothstein (1990, 1991), Gans and Smart (1996), Austen-Smith and
Banks (1999) and List (2001), and the references quoted there.
6Formally, a preference proﬁle (Â1,...,Ân) is single-peaked on X with respect to the
linear order ≤ if for all i ∈ I,t h e r ee x i s t sτi ∈ X, called the peak of i associated to the
preference relation Âi, such that (1) τi Âi x, for all x ∈ X\{τi};( 2 )y<x≤ τi implies





Table 1: Example 2
this proﬁle is single-crossing on {x, y, z}. However, for any ordering of the
alternatives, the proﬁle violates single-peakedness. 2
Example 3 Suppose three individuals, 1, 2 and 3, that have to choose an
alternative from the subset {a, b, c, d} ⊂ <+. Assume their preferences Â=
(Â1, Â2, Â3) are as in Table 2. Then, the proﬁle Â is single-peaked with
respect to the ordering of the alternatives c<a<b<d . However, if each






Table 2: Example 3
In the political arena, single-crossing makes sense if, for example, individ-
ual types are interpreted as being diﬀerent ideological characters, arranged
in the left-right scale, and the alternatives as public policies to be chosen by
the society. Put in this way, it says that, given any two policies, one of them
more to the right than the other, the more rightist a type the more will he
prefer the right-wing policy over the left-wing one.7
7Notice the diﬀerence with single-peakedness: “Intuitively, a single-peaked proﬁle is
one in which the set of alternatives can be ordered along a left-right scale in such a
way that each individual has a unique most-preferred alternative (or ideal point)a n dt h e
individual’s ranking of other alternatives falls as one moves away from her ideal point.
Such proﬁles capture the common intuition that, for example, an individual has a most
preferred ideological position on some liberal-conservative spectrum and the more distant
is a candidate’s ideological position from this most-preferred point the more the individual
dislikes the candidate.” (Austen-Smith and Banks (1999), pp. 93.)
7Given a preference Âi in the proﬁle Â∈ SC(X), we deﬁne agent i’s
induced preferences over the agenda ˜ X ∈ A(X), ˜ Âi, as follows:
∀x, y ∈ ˜ X, x ˜ Âi y ⇔ x Âi y.
Notice that the property of being single-crossing is preserved in the
induced preferences. That is, if Â∈ SC(X)t h e n˜ Â ∈ SC( ˜ X), for all
˜ X ∈ A(X).
These preferences can be aggregated. The input for this aggregation
p r o c e s si st h es e to fdeclarations of the individuals. These declarations are
intended to provide information about their true types, although their sin-
cerity cannot be ensured.
The aggregation process is represented by a social choice function. For
any ˜ X ∈ A(X), a social choice function f on SC( ˜ X) is a single-value
mapping f : SC( ˜ X) → ˜ X that associates to each preference proﬁle ˜ Â =
(˜ Â1,...,˜ Ân) ∈ SC( ˜ X) a unique outcome f(˜ Â) ∈ ˜ X.
We are primarily interested in aggregation procedures conducted by pair-
wise majority voting. This rule leads in the domain of single-crossing prefer-
ences and under the assumption of sincere voting to a collective outcome that
coincides with the median type agent’s most-preferred alternative (see The-
orem 1 below). We will examine in the next sections if agents, endowed with
this kind of preferences, have incentives to misrepresent their types in the
aggregation process. But ﬁrst, we need to deﬁne some additional concepts.
For any odd positive integer k,l e tmk : <k
+ → <+ be the k-median
function,d e ﬁned in the following way: for all x ∈ <k
+, mk(x)i st h ek-median
of x =( x1,...,x k) if and only if |{xi ∈ <+ : xi ≤ mk(x)}| ≥
(k+1)
2 and
|{xj ∈ <+ : mk(x) ≤ xj}| ≥
(k+1)
2 . Because k is odd, this function is always
well-deﬁned.
Now, we deﬁne the median choice rule in the following way. For any
individual ordering ˜ Âi in ˜ Â ∈ SC( ˜ X), let τ(˜ Âi)=M( ˜ X, ˜ Âi):
Deﬁnition 2 A social choice function fm on SC( ˜ X) is called the median




A crucial property we seek in a social choice function is strategy-proofness,
and the related concept of group-strategy-proofness. That is, we want to
consider voting rules where agents, acting individually or in groups, never
have the incentives to misrepresent their preferences. To capture this idea,
we deﬁne the following two concepts:
8Deﬁnition 3 A social choice function f on SC( ˜ X) is strategy-proof if for
all ˜ Â ∈ SC( ˜ X),a n df o ra n ya g e n ti ∈ I,w i t ht y p eθi, any misrepre-
sentation ˆ Âi = ˜ Φ(ˆ θi), ˆ θi 6= θi, is such that either f(˜ Â) ˜ Âi f(ˆ Âi, ˜ Â−i) or
f(˜ Â)=f(ˆ Âi, ˜ Â−i),w h e r e(ˆ Âi, ˜ Â−i) ∈ SC( ˜ X).8
If a social choice function f is not strategy-proof, then there exist i ∈ I
and ˆ Âi such that for some ˜ Â−i,(ˆ Âi, ˜ Â−i) ∈ SC( ˜ X), and i’s true preferences,
˜ Âi, f(ˆ Âi, ˜ Â−i) ˜ Âi f(˜ Âi, ˜ Â−i). Then, we say f is manipulable at (˜ Âi, ˜ Â−i), by
i,v i aˆ Âi.I nt h es a m ew a y :
Deﬁnition 4 A social choice function f on SC( ˜ X) is group-strategy-proof if
for all ˜ Â ∈ SC( ˜ X), and for every coalition D ⊆ I,w i t ht y p e sθD =( θi)i∈D,
there does not exist a joint misrepresentation ˆ ÂD =( ˜ Φ(ˆ θi))i∈D, ˆ θD 6= θD,
such that, for all i ∈ D, f(ˆ ÂD, ˜ ÂDc) ˜ Âi f(˜ Â),w h e r e(ˆ ÂD, ˜ ÂDc) ∈ SC( ˜ X).
In the following sections, we will study how well the median choice rule
performs, according to these manipulation criteria, on the domain of single-
crossing preference proﬁles. But, since the main motivation to do this is
to study the strategic foundation of the Representative Voter Theorem (the
“single-crossing version” of the Median Voter Theorem), let us discuss ﬁrst
the connection between single-crossing and order-restriction, which is the
original domain where this Theorem was formulated.
3 Single-crossing and order-restriction
Order-restriction, introduced formally for the ﬁrst time by Rothstein (1990,
1991), is a preference restriction that has been shown to be closely related to
single-crossing (Gans and Smart, 1996). Next we provide its deﬁnition and
an equivalence theorem (up to renaming of types) that parallels that result,
but that is more consistent with Rothstein’s original characterization.9
F o ra n yt w os e t so fi n t e g e r sA and B,l e tA> S B,r e a d“ A is higher than
B”, if for every a ∈ A and b ∈ B, a>b .
Deﬁnition 5 A preference proﬁle (Φ(θ1),...,Φ(θn)) ∈ P(X)n is order-
restricted on X if and only if there exists a permutation γ : Θ → Θ such
that for all distinct pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X,e i t h e r
{γ(θ) ∈ Θ : xΦ(γ(θ))y} >S {γ(θ) ∈ Θ : yΦ(γ(θ))x} OR − 1
8With ˜ Φ(·) we represent the restriction of Φ(·)o v e r ˜ X.
9In this section, we will make deﬁnitions and proofs over X, but everything is equally
valid for any ˜ X ∈ A(X).
9or
{γ(θ) ∈ Θ : yΦ(γ(θ))x} >S {γ(θ) ∈ Θ : xΦ(γ(θ))y} OR − 2
We call OR(X) the set of all order-restricted preference proﬁles on X.
In words, a proﬁle is order-restricted on X if we can order the types of
the individuals in such a way that for any pair of alternatives the set of
types preferring one of the alternatives all lie to one side of those who prefer
the other. It is important to emphasize that the ordering of types is not
conditional on the pair of alternatives under consideration, while the “cut-
oﬀ” types may depend on the pair. Example 4 below illustrates the concept.
Example 4 (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999): Consider the preferences
over X = {x, y, z}, with the order x<y<z , for the types θ1 < θ2 < θ3,
displayed in Table 3. This proﬁle is order-restricted over X, since there exists
a permutation γ,d e ﬁned by γ(θ1)=θ2, γ(θ2)=θ1 and γ(θ3)=θ3, such that
under this renaming of types we have that:
•{ θ : xΦ(θ)y} = {θ1,θ2} <S {θ3} = {θ : y Φ(θ)x};
•{ θ : xΦ(θ)z} = {θ1,θ2} <S {θ3} = {θ : z Φ(θ)x};





Table 3: Example 4
The following results exhibit the close relationship between OR and SC:
Lemma 1 If a preference proﬁle Â derived from Φ : Θ → P(X) is single-
crossing on X then, it satisﬁes order-restriction on X.
Proof In order to show this, consider a proﬁle (Â1,...,Ân) ∈ SC(X).
Choose any x, y ∈ X and, without loss of generality, assume y>x .S i n c eΘ
is ﬁnite, there exists θ∗ ∈ Θ such that θ∗ =m i n
θ
{θ ∈ Θ : yΦ(θ)x}.I fs u c h
type does not exist, then xΦ(θ)y for all θ ∈ Θ and order-restriction follows
immediately. Otherwise, by single-crossing, yΦ(θ)x for all θ > θ∗.F i n a l l y ,
by the completeness of the binary relation, xΦ(θ)y for all θ < θ∗.H e n c e ,
10(Â1,...,Ân) ∈ OR(X). 2
However, the converse is not true. Just consider the original ordering in
Example 4. As we showed, it is in OR(X), but it is not in SC(X) as, for
example, z Φ(θ1)y while yΦ(θ2)z,b e i n gz>yand θ2 > θ1. Nevertheless we
have the following result:
Lemma 2 For any proﬁle Â, derived from Φ : Θ → P(X), such that Â∈
OR(X), there exists a permutation ¯ γ : Θ → Θ, such that the proﬁle Â¯ γ,
derived from Φ :¯ γ(Θ) → P(X), veriﬁes Â¯ γ∈ SC(X).
Proof Consider a preference proﬁle Â∈ OR(X). Since Â∈ OR(X), there
exists a permutation γ such that for γ(Θ) and any pair of alternatives
x, y ∈ X,s a yx<y ,w eh a v ee i t h e rOR − 1o rOR − 2. In the latter case,
consider θ∗ ∈ γ(Θ), such that θ∗ =m i n
θ
{θ ∈ γ(Θ):yΦ(θ)x}. Therefore,
since y Φ(θ∗)x,w eh a v et h a tyΦ(θ)x, for any θ ∈ γ(Θ)s u c ht h a tθ > θ∗.
Thus, for ¯ γ = γ,t h ep r o ﬁle Â¯ γ is in SC(X). Instead, if γ is such that
for x<yit veriﬁes OR − 1, consider a permutation γ
0
: γ(Θ) → γ(Θ),
such that (if |γ(Θ)| = |Θ| = m), γ
0(θi)=θm−i+1,f o re v e r yθi ∈ γ(Θ).
This permutation just induces a reversion of the ordering in γ(Θ). Then,
composing γ
0 and γ we have a permutation ¯ γ such that on ¯ γ(Θ)w eh a v e
OR − 2 and again, Â¯ γ ∈ SC(X). 2
Notice that this result amounts to an equivalence (under renaming of
types in Θ)o fSC and OR.
4 The Representative Voter Theorem
Single-crossing (order-restriction) has some properties that have been shown
to be very useful in the analysis of collective decision-making processes. The
ﬁrst one, already mentioned in other parts of the paper, is that it guarantees
the existence of majority voting equilibria.
Additionally, it can also be shown that, when preferences are order-
restricted, the median type agent in the order on (θ1,...,θn) (which is unique
in our framework since I is odd) is decisive in all pairwise majority contests
between alternatives in ˜ X, for all ˜ X ∈ A(X).10 This result is sometimes
referred to as the Representative Voter Theorem (RVT) or, alternatively, as
the “second version” of the Median Voter Theorem.
10See, for example, Rothstein (1991), Myerson (1996), Gans and Smart (1996), Austen-
Smith and Banks (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
11In this section we will present formally the RVT, leaving for the next
section the task of proving its game-theoretic counterpart. But ﬁrst, two
comments are in order. The ﬁrst is to note that we will present only a
simpliﬁed version of the original RVT. It is simpler because neither individual
indiﬀerence nor the case with an even number of voters is considered.11
The second observation is that the original formulation and the proof
of the RVT were given in the context of order-restricted preferences (see
Rothstein, 1991). However, since we have shown the equivalence, under
renaming of types, of order-restriction and single-crossing, we will exploit
in the next section the fact that the median choice rule is strategy-proof
over single-crossing preferences to prove the validity of the RVT in strategic
environments. So, to maintain the internal consistency of the paper, our
proof here of the RVT uses the single-crossing condition, instead of order-
restriction.
The non-strategic version of the Representative Voter Theorem is as fol-
lows:
Theorem 1 Let fm : OR(X) → X be the median choice rule on the domain
of order-restricted preferences. Then, for each preference proﬁle Â ∈ OR(X),
and for every nonempty subset ˜ X ∈ A(X), fm(˜ Â)=M( ˜ X, ˜ Φ(θr)),w h e r e
θr = mn(θ1, θ2,...,θn).
Proof. Consider a preference proﬁle Â∈ OR(X). By Lemma 2, there
exists a proﬁle Â¯ γ ∈ SC(X) that obtains by renaming the types {θi}i∈I.
Take the agenda ˜ X ∈ A(X) and the restriction of Â¯ γ to ˜ X, ˜ Â¯ γ.D e ﬁne
the set of individuals’ maximal alternatives in ˜ X according to ˜ Â¯ γ as
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In words, Theorem 1 says that, given any subset of policies ˜ X ∈ A(X),
the alternative chosen by a society with order-restricted preferences is the
11For a more complete treatment, see the references listed in footnote 10.
12most preferred option of the median type agent.12 This result holds also
under single-peakedness if X is the range of fm, but not necessarily in other
cases. Figure 1 below illustrates this point:
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In the picture, preferences over the full set of alternatives, X =[ 0 ,1], are
single-peaked. Therefore, the Median Voter Theorem applies, and agent 2’s
unrestricted top, τ2, wins in pairwise majority voting. Moreover, the induced
proﬁle of preferences over the subset ˜ X = {a, b, c, d} ⊂ X satisﬁes also
single-peakedness, (along the linear ordering c<a<b<d ).13 However, it
is not single-crossing. Then, it turns out that agent 2’s most preferred alter-
native in ˜ X, d, is defeated by the alternative b, which is agent 3’s restricted
top and the Condorcet winner in ˜ X.
Thus, what this example shows is that under single-peakedness the me-
dian agent may depend on the particular agenda considered. This does not
happen under single-crossing. Theorem 1 guarantees that the median type θr
(and hence the individual who is of this type) is decisive over any non-empty
subset ˜ X ∈ A(X).
However, is the collective outcome predicted by the RVT robust to indi-
vidual or group manipulation? That is, can we expect this outcome to hold
when voters act strategically? The Representative Voter Theorem is a result
derived under the assumption that individuals honestly reveal their prefer-
ences or, alternatively, under the assumption that the decision-maker knows
them. Both assumptions are obviously very strong.
Fortunately, it turns out that, even if we relax these assumptions, admit-
ting both private information of individual values and strategic behavior on
the part of voters, the RVT still holds. As we will see in the next section, the
reason is that the median choice rule fm is strategy-proof on the domain of
single-crossing preference proﬁles. This implies that, in any majority contest,
each agent has a dominant strategy, which is to honestly reveal his prefer-
ences. Therefore, the RVT applies, meaning that the outcome predicted by
Theorem 1 must be expected no matter what strategic considerations are
allowed. In the following section, we derive this result formally and we pro-
12Rothstein (1991) has also shown that, when preferences are strict and the number of
voters is odd, as in our case, the preference ordering induced by the majority rule coin-
cides with the preference relation of the median type agent. This implies that the majority
preference relation inherits all the properties of the median type agent’s preference order-
ing. In particular, transitivity. Gans and Smart (1996) have proven a similar result for
non-strict preference orderings, but under strict single-crossing.
13I nf a c t ,t h i si st h ep r o ﬁle introduced in Example 3 above.
13vide an indirect mechanism that implements the prediction of the RVT in
dominant strategies.
5 Manipulation over single-crossing domains
The manipulation of the median rule has been studied for a long time in the
literature of social choice. The earliest reference goes back to the seminal
paper of Black (1948). Since then, a lot of progress has been made towards
the understanding of its properties. For instance, it is well-known today
that there exists a preference domain where this voting procedure performs
quite well, in terms of its capacity to extract truthful information about the
preferences of the agents. This domain is of course single-peakedness.
In this section, we analyze whether the median choice rule can be manip-
ulated on a diﬀerent preference domain, namely over single-crossing prefer-
ences. Even though this family of preferences is now largely used in models of
collective decision-making process, nothi n gi ss a i di nt h ee x i s t e n c el i t e r a t u r e
about the possibility of manipulation over this domain. In particular, peo-
ple uses the “single-crossing version” of the Median Voter Theorem without
asking about its strategic foundation. The main purpose here is therefore to
ﬁll this gap.
Our main result is the following:
Proposition 1 The median choice rule fm is strategy-proof over SC( ˜ X),
for any ˜ X ∈ A(X).
Proof Consider a proﬁle ˜ Â =( ˜ Âi, ˜ Â−i) ∈ SC( ˜ X), where agent i,o ft y p e
θi, has preferences ˜ Âi. Suppose that there exists another type ˆ θi such that
ˆ Âi = ˜ Φ(ˆ θi), (ˆ Âi, ˜ Â−i) ∈ SC( ˜ X), and fm(ˆ Âi, ˜ Â−i) ˜ Âi fm(˜ Â). Furthermore,
without loss of generality, assume that τ(˜ Âi) <f m(˜ Â). We have two cases
to consider:
1. τ(ˆ Âi) ≤ fm(˜ Â). Then, fm(ˆ Âi, ˜ Â−i)=fm(˜ Âi, ˜ Â−i). Contradiction;
2. τ(ˆ Âi) >f m(˜ Â). Then fm(ˆ Âi, ˜ Â−i) >f m(˜ Âi, ˜ Â−i). Let us call ˜ τ =
fm(˜ Âi, ˜ Â−i)a n dˆ τ = fm(ˆ Âi, ˜ Â−i). Since we assume that ˜ Â veriﬁes
the single-crossing property, we have that ˆ τ ˜ Φ(θ)˜ τ for all θ ≥ θi.O n
the other hand, since ˜ τ is the maximal for at least one ˜ Âj in ˜ Â,i tm u s t
be that the type corresponding to ˜ Âj,s a yθj, is such that θj < θi.B u t
then, since τ(˜ Âi) < ˜ τ, by single-crossing we have that ˜ τ ˜ Φ(θ)τ(˜ Âi) for
every θ > θj. In particular for θi. Contradiction. 2
14Thus, Proposition 1 makes the important contribution of proving that,
apart from single-peakedness, there exists another very natural preference
domain over the real line where strategy-proof choice rules can be found.
That is, it shows that single-crossing preferences constitute a domain restric-
tion that allows not only majority voting equilibria, but also the existence of
non-trivial strategy-proof social choice functions. In particular, this is true
for the median choice rule.14
Since single-crossing preferences are not necessarily single-peaked (see, for
instance, Example 2 in the text), this result has the important implication
that the violation of single-peakedness does not preclude the existence of
non-manipulable social choice functions over the real line.
Moreover, single-crossing not only may fail to satisfy single-peakedness,
but also it implies that individual preferences may be correlated. Therefore,
Proposition 1 also proves that the absence of independent individual prefer-
ence domains is not an impediment either to ﬁnd strategy-proof rules. At
least for some non-trivial and common decision rules, the existence of a linear
ordering of the types of the agents (with the requirement already mentioned
that, for any pair of alternatives, the set of types who prefer more one of
the alternatives all lie to one side oft h o s ew h op r e f e rm o r et h eo t h e r )i s
as u ﬃcient condition that ensures non-manipulation at the individual level.
Furthermore, as the following proposition shows, it turns out that it also
guarantees non-manipulation at group level:
Proposition 2 T h em e d i a nc h o i c er u l efm is group-strategy-proof over
SC( ˜ X),f o ra n y ˜ X ∈ A(X).
Proof.C o n s i d e r a p r o ﬁle ˜ Â =( ˜ Â1,...,˜ Ân) ∈ SC( ˜ X), with associated
types (θ1,...,θn). Suppose there exists a coalition D ⊆ I and a list of
alternative types for members of D,( ˆ θi)i∈D,( ˆ θi)i∈D 6=( θi)i∈D, such that the
joint declaration generated by ˆ θD, ˆ ÂD =( ˜ Φ(ˆ θi))i∈D, produces a preferred
social outcome for every member of the coalition. That is, for all i ∈ D,
f
m(ˆ ÂD, ˜ ÂDc) ˜ Âi f
m(˜ ÂD, ˜ ÂDc),
14Tohm´ e and Saporiti (2003) shows that the whole family of tops-only, eﬃcient and
strategy-proof social choice functions over single-crossing preferences is given by a subclass
of the extended median rules, obtained by distributing the phantom voters at the extremes
of the non-negative real line. This subclass, where each phantom voter is either a leftist
or a rightist, is sometimes referred to as positional dictators (see Moulin (1988), pp. 302).
These rules select the kth ranked peak among the tops of the reported preference orderings,
for some k =1 ,...,n. For example, if k =1 ,w eh a v et h eleftist rule, which chooses the
smallest reported peak of a real voter. Of course, the median choice rule is also a particular
case.
15where (ˆ ÂD, ˜ ÂDc) ∈ SC( ˜ X). For simplicity, call fm(˜ Â)=˜ τ and
fm(ˆ ÂD, ˜ ÂDc)=ˆ τ. Notice that, by the deﬁnition of fm,˜ τ and ˆ τ coin-
cide with the tops corresponding to the orderings reported by some voters.
Denote these agents j and j
0 and their types θj and θj
0, respectively. Since
˜ τ 6=ˆ τ assume that ˜ τ < ˆ τ. Then, for all i ∈ D, τ(˜ Âi) > ˜ τ. Suppose not. That
is, assume τ(˜ Âi) ≤ ˜ τ for some agent i in D.I fτ(˜ Âi)=˜ τ,t h e n˜ τ ˜ Âi ˆ τ,w h i c h
contradicts our hypothesis. Consider, instead, that τ(˜ Âi) < ˜ τ.S i n c eˆ τ ˜ Âi ˜ τ,
by single-crossing we have that for all θ > θi,ˆ τ ˜ Φ(θ)˜ τ.T h e n ,θj has to ver-
ify that θj < θi and, by single-crossing, ˜ τ ˜ Φ(θj)τ(˜ Âi)i m p l i e s˜ τ ˜ Φ(θi)τ(˜ Âi).
Contradiction. Then, τ(˜ Âi) > ˜ τ, for all i ∈ D. The rest of the proof is as
follows. By deﬁnition,
f
m(˜ ÂD, ˜ ÂDc)=m
n(τ(˜ Â1),...,τ(˜ Ân)) = ˜ τ,
while
f
m(ˆ ÂD, ˜ ÂDc)=m
n({τ(ˆ Âi)}i∈D,{τ(˜ Âj)}j∈Dc)=ˆ τ.
Two cases are possible:
1. For each i ∈ D, τ(ˆ Âi) > ˜ τ.T h e nˆ τ =˜ τ. Contradiction.
2. For some i ∈ D, τ(ˆ Âi) ≤ ˜ τ. Then, by rewritten
({τ(ˆ Âi)}i∈D,{τ(˜ Âj)}j∈Dc)a s( y1,...,y n), we have that
¯ ¯ ¯{j ∈ {1,...,n} : yj ≤ ˜ τ}




But this implies that mn(y1,...,y n) ≤ ˜ τ.T h a t i s , f(ˆ ÂD, ˜ ÂDc) ≤
f(˜ ÂD, ˜ ÂDc), which contradicts our initial hypothesis. 2
Next we will use these positive results for the median choice rule to pro-
vide the game-theoretic counterpart of the Representative Voter Theorem.
To do that, notice ﬁrst that, according the the Revelation Principle, if a social
choice function is truthfully implementable in a dominant strategy equilib-
rium, it must be strategy-proof. That is, strategy-proofness is a necessary
condition for truthfully or direct implementation.
However, it is not suﬃcient.I t i s i n f a c t s u ﬃcient when the preference
domain of the social choice function can be written as a Cartesian prod-
uct (Moore, 1992). Otherwise, the direct revelation mechanism is not well-
deﬁned, in the sense that the set of strategies of each agent, i.e., the set of
16admissible individual preference orderings that can be declared, depends on
the strategies used by the others.15
This is precisely our case. Proposition 1 shows that fm is strategy-proof
over SC( ˜ X), for any ˜ X ∈ A(X). Thus, the necessary condition for the ap-
plication of the Revelation Principle holds. However, under single-crossing,
individual preferences may be correlated. Therefore, SC( ˜ X)c a n n o tb ew r i t -
ten as a Cartesian product subset of P( ˜ X)n.T h a ti s ,t h es u ﬃcient condition
fails, and the implementation of fm in dominant strategy equilibria has to
be explicitly analyzed.
In what follows, we will informally present an extensive game form that
c a nb eu s e dt oindirectly implement fm in dominant strategies. After that,
we will argue that this game form is essentially equivalent to a reduced mech-
anism in normal form, and we prove that this last mechanism succeeds in
implementing the median rule. We will also brieﬂyd i s c u s sw h yt h ee x t e n s i v e
game form or its associated reduced game form works, but not the direct
mechanism in which each individual simply declares his top in ˜ X.F i n a l l y ,
we will derive as a by-product the game-theoretic equivalent of Proposition
1.
5.1 Implementation of the median choice rule
Suppose individuals in I have preferences (Â1,...,Ân) ∈ SC(X). Assume
the selection of a social outcome in ˜ X, which is the planner’s basic problem,
is indirectly performed by the following two-stage voting procedure. In the
ﬁrst stage, individuals select by pairwise majority voting a representative
individual from the set I. Then, in the second stage, the winner chooses an
alternative in ˜ X, which is then the policy implemented by the planner.
Since in the last stage each individual i has a dominant strategy, which is
simply to choose his most preferred alternative in ˜ X, τ(˜ Âi), it is immediate
to see that this extensive game form is equivalent to a reduced strategic
game form in which individuals choose by pairwise majority comparisons an
alternative in the set T( ˜ X, ˜ Â)={τ(˜ Â1),...,τ(˜ Âi),...,τ(˜ Ân)}.
Now we prove that this reduced mechanism can be used to implement fm
in a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 6 Am e c h a n i s mΓ with consequences in ˜ X is a strategic game
form hI, (Si), φi where, for each i ∈ I, Si is the set of actions available
15A possible way of solving this consists in asking to each individual to report a pref-
erence proﬁle, instead of his individual preference ordering. If the social choice function
is strategy-proof, then it can be shown that reporting the true preferences of the whole
society is a dominant strategy for each individual. See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for
a formal proof.
17for agent i,a n dφ :
Q
i∈I Si → ˜ X is an outcome function that associates an
alternative with every action proﬁle.
We say that Γ implements a social choice function f : SC( ˜ X) → ˜ X
in dominant strategies if there exists a dominant strategy equilibrium for
the mechanism, yielding the same outcome as f for each possible preference
proﬁle ˜ Â ∈ SC( ˜ X). This is formally stated in Deﬁnition 7.
Deﬁnition 7 The mechanism Γ = hI, (Si), φi implements the social choice
function f : SC( ˜ X) → ˜ X in dominant strategies if there exists a dominant
strategy equilibrium of Γ, s∗(·)=( s∗
1(·),...,s ∗
n(·)),s u c ht h a tφ(s∗(˜ Â)) = f(˜ Â)
for all ˜ Â ∈ SC( ˜ X).
Proposition 3 There exists a mechanism that implements fm : SC( ˜ X) →
˜ X in dominant strategies over ˜ X.
Proof. Consider a preference proﬁle ˜ Â ∈ SC( ˜ X) and the mechanism Γ =
hI, (Si), φi,w h e r eI is the set of players; an action for agent i ∈ I is simply
to choose an element in Si = T( ˜ X, ˜ Â)={τ(˜ Â1),...,τ(˜ Âi),...,τ(˜ Ân)};a n d
the outcome function φ(s1,...,s n)=mn(s1,...,s n). We will show that the
action proﬁle (τ(˜ Â1),...,τ(˜ Ân)) constitutes a dominant strategy equilibrium
of the game induced by Γ.T h a ti s ,
φ(s1,...,τ(˜ Âi),...,s n) ˜ Âi φ(s1,...,ˆ si,...,s n)
for all i, ˆ si 6= τ(˜ Âi),s −i ∈
Q
j6=i Sj. Since, by deﬁnition, φ(·)=mn(·), we
can easily recast the proof of Proposition 1 to ﬁt in this scheme. Suppose
that there exists such ˆ si.C a l l˜ s = φ(τ(˜ Âi),s −i)a n dˆ s = φ(ˆ si,s −i). Without
loss of generality, assume τ(˜ Âi) < ˜ s. We have two cases to consider:
1. ˆ si ≤ ˜ s. Then, mn(τ(˜ Âi),s −i)=mn(ˆ si,s −i) and, therefore,
φ(τ(˜ Âi),s −i)=φ(ˆ si,s −i). Contradiction.
2. ˆ si > ˜ s. Then the new median ˆ s will be in the interval [˜ s, ˆ si]. By hy-
pothesis, ˆ s ˜ Âi ˜ s. Furthermore, since the preferences are single-crossing
on T( ˜ X, ˜ Â)a n dˆ s>˜ s, for every θ > θi we have that ˆ s ˜ Φ(θ)˜ s.O n
the other hand, notice that, since each Sj = T( ˜ X, ˜ Â), there must exist
θj ∈ Θ such that ˜ s = τ(˜ Φ(θj)). Moreover, θj must be such that θj < θi.
But then, since τ(˜ Âi) < ˜ s and ˜ s ˜ Φ(θj)τ(˜ Âi), by single-crossing, we have
that ˜ s ˜ Φ(θ)τ(˜ Âi)f o ra l lθ > θj; in particular for θi. Contradiction.
18Therefore, (τ(˜ Â1),...,τ(˜ Ân)) is a dominant strategy equilibrium. 2
The fact that the alternative declared by each agent is restricted to belong
to T( ˜ X, ˜ Â), the set of all individual maximal alternatives in ˜ X, is crucial for
the proof of Proposition 3. It is easy to see that a mechanism based on
direct declarations of the most preferred alternatives in ˜ X cannot be used
to implement fm. For instance, in Example 2, if agents are asked to declare
their most preferred alternatives in ˜ X = {x, y, z}, then manipulation cannot
be avoided: if agent 1 and agent 3 declare y and z, respectively, then player
2 will prefer to announce z instead of his true top x.16
Instead, the reason of why our indirect mechanism works is because the
induced preferences over the set T( ˜ X, ˜ Â), derived from ˜ Â ∈ SC( ˜ X), are
single-peaked. This is formally shown in Lemma 3 below. Notice that
T( ˜ X, ˜ Â)c a nb ei d e n t i ﬁed with the set of actual ideal points, {x ∈ ˜ X :
∃i ∈ I such that x = τ(˜ Âi)}:
Lemma 3 If a preference proﬁle ˜ Â =( ˜ Â1,...,˜ Ân) is single-crossing over
˜ X, then the restriction of ˜ Â over the set T( ˜ X, ˜ Â) is single-peaked.
Proof.F o r a g i v e n p r o ﬁle (˜ Â1,...,˜ Ân) ∈ SC( ˜ X) and the associated
set T( ˜ X, ˜ Â), consider the restriction of ˜ Â to T( ˜ X, ˜ Â), denoted ˜ ÂT =
(˜ ÂT
1,...,˜ ÂT
n). By contradiction, suppose ˜ ÂT 6∈ SP(T)n,w h e r eSP(T)n is
the set of all single-peaked preference proﬁles over T( ˜ X, ˜ Â) (with respect to
the linear order ≤). Then, there exist an individual i ∈ I, with type θi ∈ Θ,
and x, y, τ(˜ Âi) ∈ T( ˜ X, ˜ Â) such that
x<y≤ τ(˜ Âi), but x ˜ Â
T
i y.
Thus, y 6= τ(˜ Âi). Moreover, since ˜ ÂT ∈ SC(T), x ˜ ÂT
j y for all θj ≤ θi.
This means y 6= τ(˜ Âj)f o ra l lθj ∈ {θ1, θ2,...,θi}. However, since we
assume y ∈ T( ˜ X, ˜ Â), then y = τ(˜ Âk) for some individual k ∈ I with
type θk ∈ {θi+1, θi+2,...,θn}. Then, y ˜ Âk τ(˜ Âi) implies y ˜ Âj τ(˜ Âi)f o ra l l
θj ≤ θk. In particular, for θi. Contradiction. The same argument applies if
τ(˜ Âi) ≤ y<xand x ˜ ÂT
i y. Hence, ˜ ÂT ∈ SP(T)n. 2
16Proposition 1 shows that individual manipulation is ruled out when agents are required
to declare a complete preference ordering, and not just the top alternative. The intuition
is again illustrated by Example 2. Notice that in this case individual 1 cannot summit an
ordering with the alternative y as its top without violating the single-crossing condition.
Thus, player 2 has no reason to lie.
19It is easy to show that the converse of Lemma 3 does not hold. That is,
preferences can be single-peaked over T( ˜ X, ˜ Â), but not necessarily single-
crossing on T( ˜ X, ˜ Â). The preference proﬁl ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e4b e l o w
provides an example in which this happens.






Finally, we derive the following Corollary from Proposition 3:
Corollary 1 For any ˜ X ∈ A(X), there exists a mechanism that implements
fm : OR( ˜ X) → ˜ X in dominant strategies over ˜ X.
Proof. Trivial. Consider any preference proﬁle ˜ Â ∈ OR( ˜ X). By Lemma
2, there exists a permutation ¯ γ of Θ that generates a proﬁle ˜ Â¯ γ ∈ SC( ˜ X).
Hence, the mechanism deﬁned in Proposition 3 yields, as the outcome
of its dominant strategy equilibrium, the median value of the maximal
alternatives over ˜ X, φ(˜ Â¯ γ)=mn(τ(˜ Â
¯ γ
1),...,τ(˜ Â¯ γ
n)) = τ(˜ Φ(θ¯ γ
r)). Finally,





This Corollary provides the strategic counterpart of Proposition 1. That
is, it shows that, when preferences are order-restricted, the social outcome
under pairwise majority voting, i.e. the most preferred alternative of the
median type, can be attained by a reduced mechanism in which agents are
allowed to declare one of the individual maximal alternatives in the feasible
set of policies. Or, alternatively, it can be achieved by following a two-
stage voting procedure in which, ﬁrst, the individuals select a representative
among themselves, and then the representative voter chooses a policy to be
implemented by the planner.
6 Final remarks
In this paper, we exhibited several results. First of all, we have proven that,
apart from single-peakedness, there exists another very natural preference
20domain over the real line for which strategy-proof choice rules can be found.
Concretely, we have shown that single-crossing preferences constitute a do-
main restriction that allows not only majority voting equilibria, but also the
existence of non-trivial strategy-proof (as well as group-strategy-proof) social
choice functions. In particular, thi si st r u ef o rt h em e d i a nc h o i c er u l e .
The ﬁrst feature to remark of this result is that single-crossing prefer-
ences do not necessarily satisfy single-peakedness. But, as it is known, in
one-dimensional collective decision models this is one of the most frequently
applied domain restrictions that guarantee strategy-proofness. Thus, the
result found here shows that the violation of single-peakedness does not pre-
clude the existence of non-manipulable social choice functions over the real
line.
Furthermore, single-crossing also implies that individual preferences are
correlated. Therefore, Proposition 1 also proves that the absence of inde-
pendent individual preference domains is not an obstacle for the existence
of strategy-proof rules. At least for some non-trivial and common decision
rules, the existence of a certain kind of linear ordering of the types of the
agents is a suﬃcient condition that ensures non-manipulation both at the
individual and at the group level.
Another important results are summarized in Lemmas 1 and 2, which
exhibit the close relation between single-crossing and order-restriction. A
previous work in the same direction is Gans and Smart (1996), in which these
preference domains are shown to be essentially equivalent. Nevertheless, our
results diﬀer from theirs in two ways. First, ours seem to be more consis-
tent with Rothstein’s original characterization of order-restriction. Second,
particular attention is devoted here to the fact that these conditions may
not be directly equivalent. The crucial point to understand this diﬀerence is
that, unlike single-crossing, order-restriction does not assumes any ordering
on the set of possible alternatives. Furthermore, it is precisely this feature
that makes order-restriction so interesting for analyzing strategy-proofness
in multi-dimensional choice spaces and over restricted agendas.
Finally, these previous results are used at the end of the paper to show
that the Representative Voter Theorem has a well-deﬁned non-cooperative
strategic foundation. Concretely, we show that the collective outcome pre-
dicted by this Theorem can be implemented through a simple sequential
mechanism in which, ﬁrst, individuals select a representative among them-
selves, and then the representative voter chooses a policy to be implemented
by the planner. Given that the structure of this mechanism presents some
features that we observe frequently in “real” voting processes, the analysis
carried out here may also provide insights for a rationale of these “real”
voting situations.
21A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h e r ea r es i g n i ﬁcant topics that this paper does not
cover. The most important task that we have left for future work is to
fully characterize the family of strategy-proof social choice functions over
single-crossing preference proﬁles. Of course, the classes that also satisfy
other requirements like anonymity, Pareto eﬃciency or combinations of them
should also be determined.
The second relevant aspect that we do not address here is how these
results change when individual preference orderings are allowed to express
indiﬀerence between diﬀerent alternatives. Clearly, our simpliﬁcation is justi-
ﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h es e to fp o s s i b l es o c i a lo u t c o m e si sﬁnite. However, we
guess substantial changes may be expected in our results if this assumption
is dropped.
Finally, another problem that must be answered is how to extend single-
crossing and order-restriction to multidimensional spaces. That is, we should
consider the way in which these preference restrictions can deal with both
multidimensional choice sets and political conﬂicts of interests that cannot
be projected onto a one-dimensional space.
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